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ARTICLES
UNCARING JUSTICE: WHY
JACQUE V. STEENBERG HOMES
WAS WRONGLY DECIDED
JOHN MAKDISIt
INTRODUCTION

On February 15, 1994, Steenberg Homes ("Steenberg")
delivered a mobile home to a neighbor of Lois and Harvey
Jacque.' The Jacques were an elderly retired couple who owned
about 170 acres in a town in Wisconsin.2 Their neighbor had
bought the home with delivery included.3 Steenberg asked the
Jacques if it could deliver the home to the neighbor across the
Jacques' property but the Jacques repeatedly refused.4 On the
day of delivery, the private road to the neighbor's house was
"covered in up to seven feet of snow and contained a sharp curve
which would require sets of 'rollers' to be used when
maneuvering the home around the curve."5 So Steenberg decided
to plow a path across the Jacques' snow-covered field in order to
deliver the home to the neighbor despite the Jacques' refusal to
give it permission.6 The Jacques successfully sued Steenberg for
trespass, and the jury awarded them $1 in nominal damages
I Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; Ph.D. Candidate in
Moral Theology, The Catholic University of America. I would like to thank Dean
Douglas Ray and the St. Thomas University School of Law for the award of a
summer grant to complete this Article. I would also like to thank John Grabowski,
June Mary Makdisi and Siegfried Wiessner for their helpful comments.
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 156-57 (Wis. 1997).
Id. at 156.

Id.
Id. at 157.
5 Id. As one article notes, the company "faced considerable risk, and not a little
time and effort, if it had to use rollers to wrestle the ungainly mobile home around a
curved private road covered in seven feet of snow." Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, The Morality of Property,48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1872 (2007).
6 Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at
156.
4
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because the trespass did not cause any actual harm to the
premises.' What is surprising is that the jury also awarded
$100,000 to the Jacques in punitive damages and that this award
was upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court essentially protected the
Jacques' right to exclude Steenberg from their property,
regardless of the fact that Steenberg was in a difficult position.
If the need had been to save a life or the serious loss of property,
and there was no other way to save it, Steenberg would have
been able to claim necessity and justify its action.' But here,
where the loss was not life-threatening, the court took an
opposite position. It found no justification for Steenberg's action
and even condemned it as a serious infraction of the law
protecting property.10 The court did not consider it important
that no physical harm had been done to the Jacques' property or
that the Jacques had been uncaring in refusing to grant
permission for the temporary use of their land. Instead, the
court felt that Steenberg's behavior needed a deterrent greater
than the judgment of liability and so permitted the jury award of
$100,000 in punitive damages to stand.'" What was the court
protecting?
Many commentators see the Jacque case as protecting
human flourishing.
Gregory Alexander makes one of the
stronger cases to support this rationale for the $100,000 punitive
damage award.12 His concept of human flourishing focuses on
Id. at 158.
* The circuit court set aside the punitive damage award; the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin reinstated it. Id.
9 Ben Depoorter, Essay, Fair Trespass, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1099-1100,
1127-29 (2011).
10

Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 164.

n1 Id. at 163-64. According to the court, "[tihe Jacques were sensitive about
allowing others on their land because they had lost property valued at over $10,000
to other neighbors in an adverse possession action in the mid-1980's." Id. at 157. Yet
the action in this case posed no threat of adverse possession and was not detrimental
in any way to their property interest. Steenberg had taken the time to ask for
permission to use their land and had inquired about the money it would take to get
their permission. The court was unimpressed.
12 Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property
Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 815-17 (2009). This article appears as the lead article
in a symposium issue that urges stronger consideration of "the underlying human
values that property serves and the social relationships it shapes and reflects."
Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 743, 743 (2009) (introducing the articles in the May 2009 issue of the Cornell
Law Review). Alexander advocates turning away from the traditional paradigms of
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enabling a person to live freely, and in many of his examples
from legal cases, he successfully shows how the law promotes the
capabilities of a person to live freely by either derogating from, or
protecting, the right to exclude. The problem with his concept of
human flourishing is that it stops short of an understanding of
what it means to live freely. So while his analysis succeeds for
most of his examples, it fails to interpret the Jacque case
correctly.
The first part of this Article examines Alexander's concept of
human flourishing in light of the examples of legal cases that he
uses to illustrate his argument. It should become clear in the
course of this discussion that Alexander sees human autonomy as
an end in itself. While he asks how the law enables a person to
live freely, he does not ask what a person should do with this
ability to live freely once one has it. But the law is not so
shortsighted. It encourages the use of one's freedom to care for
one's neighbor. So, following the discussion of Alexander's
examples, this Article produces further examples of legal cases to
show that the purpose of the law is to care for one's neighbor. In
fact, two cases very similar to the Jacque case, in other
jurisdictions, do allow a trespass over the property of another
who has not given permission for that trespass.13 These cases
derogate from the right to exclude in order to accommodate
people in need even though the need is not life-threatening.
There is a significant difference between Alexander's concept
of human flourishing as living freely and the concept of human
flourishing as living freely for a purpose. The former defines the
good as the act of choosing and acting in an undirected way; the
latter defines the good as the act of choosing and acting in a
directed way. The second part of this Article examines how the
former concept developed from the time of Grotius until today,
when it is captured by the words of United States Supreme Court
Justice Anthony Kennedy: "At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life."14 "Right" in this sense does
not permit an evaluation of the specific motivations, intentions,
objectives, or consequences that are connected to actions that
legal thought that focus on social utility and economic efficiency in order to think of
law as a vehicle to promote human flourishing. Alexander, supra,at 748.
11 See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
14 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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take place within the space of a right. The right stands apart
from the purpose for which it is exercised. There is no good or
bad in actions as long as they take place within the space of a
right. This discussion helps show how Alexander's concept of
right is really the space for freedom. It does not envision the
function of law as promoting the use of one's freedom to care for
one's neighbor.
The thesis of this Article is that law must do more than
promote the capabilities that enable a person to live freely; it
must promote the proper use of those capabilities if one is to
achieve true human flourishing. In particular, the law should
encourage one to care for one's neighbor. The Jacques turned a
cold shoulder to Steenberg's plea for help. In the Parable of the
Good Samaritan, the priest and the Levite also turned away
when they saw a man beaten by bandits lying on the other side of
the road.'" They refused to take the time and trouble to cross the
road to help him out.'6 Yet the Good Samaritan-the good
neighbor-was moved by compassion to stop his journey and
spend the time, money, and effort to care for the man." Which of
these people promoted human flourishing? Christ tells us that it
was the Good Samaritan. If the law is to promote human
flourishing it should encourage such behavior. The emphasis
here is on the word encourage; this Article does not argue that
the law should force such behavior."' True caring can only result
15Luke 10:25-32 (New American).
1s Id. at 10:30-32.

Id. at 10:33-37.
"I See Eduardo M. Pefialver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 821, 869-74
(2009) (arguing that an indirect "goal of enshrining certain obligations of virtuous
conduct into law would be to constrain the behavior of nonvirtuous owners and, over
time, to teach them to act virtuously of their own accord"). The merits of this
approach are beyond the scope of this Article, but, if there is an objection to
Pefialver's imposition of virtuous conduct, it involves the impact on the development
of virtue as a freely chosen habit. It is not the skeptical objection voiced by Claeys.
Claeys does not believe that a legal system can tolerate more than just a little
virtue-centric regulation. Eric R. Claeys, Response, Virtue and Rights in American
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 889, 891 (2009). He says that "competing
religious, ethnic, or partisan factions find it hard to resist the temptation to use
virtue theory as an ideological tool, to establish hegemony over rival factions in their
local communities." Id. at 892. Therefore, the government should not be able to
compel citizens to follow any one contestable theory of virtue. Claeys condones the
fact that where virtues do have a say, they are usually "the least controversial and
most encompassing virtues: patriotism, civility, sexual restraint, or industry." Id.
"Moreover, when they promote such virtues, liberal political orders generally refrain
from promoting virtue for virtue's sake; instead, they claim that citizens' rights
17
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from free choice. Yet this does not mean that the law has no role
to play. At the very least, the law should not discourage caring.
By awarding the $100,000 punitive damage award in the Jacque
case, the court discouraged the Jacques from behaving as the
Good Samaritan did; it actually rewarded the Jacques' total
disregard of Steenberg's difficulty.
The third part of this Article examines the basis for an ethic
of caring by looking to the work of Saint Thomas Aquinas.
Aquinas starts with the notion that right is not a concept
independent of direction. Right starts with a concept of what is
due in a relationship between two persons; right is the
correlative of duty. We are created for happiness, but happiness
is not automatic nor is it something that we create for ourselves.
It is something we attain by giving what is due, and what is due
in a relationship gives the other a right. For Aquinas, then, not
only must a person have the capabilities for human flourishing,
but that person must act with those capabilities to achieve
human flourishing. One does not have the space for freedom to
act in ways that are devoid of moral direction. Every human act
is directed to the good, and human autonomy, which exists in the
capabilities for human flourishing, exists only so that one can
choose the good in order to achieve human flourishing. Aquinas
ultimately guides his reader to see that the good of human
flourishing is the freely chosen giving of oneself in caring. When
the Jacques turned away from Steenberg, they missed the chance
to use their capabilities to achieve human flourishing. The law
should not have encouraged this behavior. It should have
rejected the jury award of $100,000.
I.

GREGORY ALEXANDER'S SOCIAL-OBLIGATION NORM

Commentators on the Jacque case generally maintain that
its protection of the right to exclude promotes the important
They give various
value of dominion over property.' 9
cannot be secure unless citizens are virtuous enough to respect one another's rights
freely." Id. So, according to Claeys, the real reason for promoting virtue, if any, is to
ensure security-not to teach citizens how to care for others for their own sake.
19 See, e.g., Steven Hetcher, The Kids Are Alright: Applying a Fault Liability
Standard to Amateur DigitalRemix, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1275, 1300 (2010) ("a person's
home is her castle"); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Essay, Reconceptualizing
Trespass, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1823, 1832, 1834-35 (2009) ("preserving the property
owner's dominion"). But see Peter A. Alces, UnintelligentDesign in Contract, 2008 U.
ILL. L. REV. 505, 544-45 ("wholly unreasonable" to deny brief access to the Jacques'
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explanations why this dominion is valuable. The owner enjoys a
dignity in such dominion.2 0 The owner has the power to set his or
her own subjectively valued price for the land and its use. 2 1 The
owner enjoys security.2 2 The owner has the power to pursue a
"privacy-driven agenda."2 3 Ownership plays an "instrumental
role in the promotion of utility, welfare, or wealth,"24 and protects
the owner's "subjective perceptions of control, use, and
enjoyment."25 The courts are said to protect this dominion as a
right to exclude even without inquiry into the reasonableness of
its exercise or the benefits of the intruder's actions.2 6
Furthermore, because of the uncertainty of measuring these
values, an award of compensatory-market-measurabledamages is not sufficient to ensure that the owner receives an
equivalent award for the loss the owner endures at the hands of
the trespasser. Therefore, courts are justified, as in the Jacque
case, in awarding punitive damages in order to ensure that
trespasses like that of Steenberg are deterred in the future."

property); Merrill & Smith, supra note 5, at 1872-73 ("no attempt to consider
whether the trespass would have been cost-justified"). The latter two commentators
judge the behavior of the Jacques as unreasonable, the trespass as something more
valuable to Steenberg than the right to exclude was to the Jacques, and the judicial
decision as one that promoted inefficiency. These commentators reject the decision
on economic-not moral-grounds. In fact, they disparage the common morality of
property law that they think generated the decision. This Article is not concerned
with economic efficiency but rather with the proper moral ground on which to decide
the case. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the moral result that this Article
advocates in the Jacque case is the same as that advocated by an argument for
efficiency-only for reasons that are diametrically opposed. The moral failure is that
the Jacques failed to exercise charity towards Steenberg, whereas the efficiency
failure is that Steenberg was the party with more to gain from the entitlement.
20 Hetcher, supra note 19, at 1300-01.
21 Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 617, 641 (2009) (book review); Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 19, at
1832.
12 Claeys, supra note 21, at 640.
23 Id.; Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO
L. J. 275. 302-03 (2008).
24 Hetcher, supra note 19, at 1301.
25 Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law
and Economics,
and Natural PropertyRights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1419 (2010).
26 Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and PropertyRules in the Law of Nuisance,
90 VA.
L. REV. 965, 983-84 (2004). This includes the possibility that the decision to exclude
may be based on "spite, opportunism, or mere caprice." Depoorter, supra note 9, at
1098.
27 Mark Strasser, A Jurisprudence in Disarray: On Battery, Wrongful Living,
and the Right to Bodily Integrity, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 997, 1019-20 (1999).

2012]

UNCARING JUSTICE: JACQUE

117

Gregory Alexander agrees that the Jacque case protects the
right to exclude in order to promote the important value of
dominion over property in "the interests of home owners in
protecting their privacy and associational autonomy."28 But he
takes the analysis to a deeper level than most commentators by
explaining why these interests are valuable. The privacy of the
home and its associational autonomy are not merely the
possession of particular goods or the satisfaction of particular
preferences; rather, they make it possible to develop and
experience all, or nearly all, the capabilities that are necessary
for human flourishing.2 9
Alexander takes the Aristotelian
teleological view that each person is made for a distinctively
human life that needs certain capabilities in order to be lived.o
These capabilities are the freedom or power to choose to function
with such goods as life and good health, the freedom to make
deliberate choices, practical reasoning, and sociality.3 ' The
Jacque case promotes these capabilities, including, in particular,
the capability of sociality. The security one has in the privacy
and autonomy of one's own home gives one the freedom or power
to form healthy relationships with others. 32 For this reason the
law must protect this privacy and autonomy.

Alexander, supra note 12, at 816.
Id. at 764, 816. Margaret Jane Radin makes a similar point when she states
that the sanctity of the home protects liberty by giving a realm that is shut off from
interference from others. The home is "the scene of one's history and future, one's
life and growth. . . . [O]ne embodies or constitutes oneself there." Margaret Jane
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 992 (1982).
" Alexander, supra note 12, at 761. For this approach, Alexander draws on the
work of MARGARET C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE
CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2008), and AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM
(2009). "Importantly, Nussbaum and Sen distinguish between the first-order
patterns that constitute well-lived human lives ('functionings') and the second-order
freedom or power to choose to function in particular ways, which they call
'capabilities.' " Alexander, supra note 12, at 764. Alexander argues for promoting the
value of one's life through the law's assurance of one's capabilities but avoids a
discussion of promoting the value of one's life through the law's encouragement of
the proper functionings that result from the proper use of one's capabilities. He
justifies this avoidance by advocating "a proper concern for human autonomy
[which] requires looking beyond mere functionings to include the capabilities that
various social matrices generate for their members." Id. at 765.
31 Alexander, supra note 12, at 764-65.
32 Id. at 816.
28
29
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One develops the necessary capabilities only in society and
in dependence on other human beings.33 Alexander reasons from
this fact that it is only rational that one who is dependent on
others to foster one's own flourishing must commit to foster the
flourishing of others. 34 Thus, he derives a social-obligation norm
whereby each person is "obligated to support and nurture the
social structures without which those human capabilities cannot
be developed." 5 This norm is not merely an expression of an
autonomous decision to act based on preference satisfaction. It is
rooted objectively36 in a person's nature, which directs one to a
distinctively human life for oneself and, because a person needs
the help of others in this endeavor, requires one to enable a
distinctively human life for others. In this way, a society of
individuals helping others will redound to one's own advantage.
It is important to note that Alexander's thesis is that one
flourishes by the development of one's own capabilities as an
objective good intrinsically valuable in itself.38 Furthermore, the
use of these capabilities to satisfy the obligation to help others
develop their capabilities is a means to one's own end of
developing one's own capabilities-a type of debt that one owes to
others in society in exchange for one's own dependence on others
as a whole.3 ' Alexander does not maintain that helping others
under the social-obligation norm is an end in itself. The act of

" Id. at 761. This truism brings to mind the famous saying of John Donne:
No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a
part of the main; if a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as
well as if a promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friend's or of thine
own were; any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in
mankind, and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls
for thee.
John Donne, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions, in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN DONNE,
D.D., Dean of Saint Paul's 493, 575 (1839).
34 Alexander, supra note 12, at 769. Drawing on Gewirth's interpretation of
Kant's Categorical Imperative for support, Alexander says that "to avoid
contradicting ourselves we must acknowledge that all persons, as rational agents in
the same relevant sense, have rights as well." Id. at 768-69.
" Id. at 769.
36 Alexander maintains that the "well-lived life is a life that conforms to certain
objectively valuable patterns of human existence and interaction." Id. at 763; see id.
at 763 n.70 (explaining this notion of objectivity).
" Id. at 770-71, 773.
38 Id. at 767-68.
3 Id. at 770.
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helping others does not help one flourish if it is not reciprocated
at least generally. It is only a means to the end of helping
oneself.40
Given that the pursuit of one's own distinctively human life
is not defined as caring for and helping others to pursue their
own distinctively human lives but only uses the caring and
helping as a means, it is inevitable that tensions will arise
between pursuing one's own life and helping others to pursue
theirs when there is a conflict. On the one hand, one achieves
the capabilities to lead a distinctively human life in the privacy
and autonomy of home ownership realized through the right to
exclude. On the other hand, one helps others to achieve their
capabilities to lead a distinctively human life by giving them
access to certain property interests realized through a derogation
from one's own right to exclude. How does one determine when
one should exclude others and when one should not? Alexander
maintains that "the multiple relevant components of human
flourishing are incommensurable" and that one should eschew
"any pretense of precise ex ante predictions."4 1 He provides a
number of examples where he believes that the state acted
properly in derogation of the right to exclude, such as in the cases
of historic preservation laws, environmental laws, the public

40 Alexander refers to virtue ethics and quotes Rosalind Hursthouse to say that
a virtue ethicist, when addressing the issue of helping someone in need, will point to
the fact that it would be charitable or benevolent. Id. at 761 n.65. Charity involves
the idea of caring for others as an end in itself, but there is no indication that
Alexander adopts this point of view. He appears to make this reference in order to
affirm that a substantive understanding of what it means to live a flourishing life
might include being charitable or benevolent but need not. Id. at 761. He is more
concerned with promoting the norm of justice, which assures that one can live freely,
regardless of the substantive content of living freely. He advocates that community
should foster a society of just social relations, that is, one "in which individuals can
interact with each other in a manner consistent with norms of equality, dignity,
respect, and justice as well as freedom and autonomy." Id. at 767. In an earlier
article, Alexander similarly avoids speaking to the substantive content of using one's
capabilities, stating that:
[W]e will not wade into the thicket surrounding questions such as whether
the content of human flourishing is best understood as rooted (ultimately)
in observations about human beings' essential nature or whether instead
they are (ultimately) derived, as John Finnis and others have argued, from
self-evident truths about what is good for human beings.
Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Pefialver, Properties of Community, 10
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAw 127, 136 (2009); see also supra note 30.
41 Alexander, supra note 12, at 751.
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trust doctrine, and access to vital services.42 He also provides a
nuisance case to show that sometimes the answer is not clear. 43
According to Alexander, these cases show the law's attempt fairly
to resolve the different needs of individuals for the capabilities of
human flourishing.4 A brief review of these cases will illustrate
how Alexander sees this being done.
A.

Historic PreservationLaws

These laws require property owners to respect the unique
character of the neighborhood, as in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York,4 5 where Penn Central was not allowed to

build on top of its Grand Central Terminal and was not
compensated for this restriction.4 6 In justification of the decision,
Alexander states that "because individuals can develop as free
and fully rational moral agents only within a particular type of
culture, all individuals owe their communities an obligation to
support in appropriate ways the institutions and infrastructure
that are part of the foundation of that culture."47 These laws
support the capability of practical reasoning. Also, through the
promotion of culture, they support the capability of freedom.4 8
B.

Environmental Laws

These laws similarly require respect for what contributes to
essential human goods. In the case of wetlands regulations, the
goods are human life and the health of various ecosystems,
maintained by wetlands, on which human beings are
dependent. 49 Alexander reads the Florida Supreme Court in

Id. at 791.
* Id. at 755.
42

* Id. at 773-75.
4

438 U.S. 104 (1978).

" Alexander, supra note 12, at 791-93.
41 Id. at 794-95 (footnote omitted). Smith accepts the point of Alexander's
emphasis on a social obligation to furnish others with the means to flourish if their
property has a sufficient nexus to the need. This is what underlies Alexander's
desire to see common culture preserved in historic buildings and recreational uses
permitted to the public on privately owned beaches. But Smith raises the question
why certain people should provide these benefits at personal expense. Henry E.
Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 960-61 (2009).
4 Alexander, supra note 12, at 766.
4 Id. at 796, 799.
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Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc. 0 as possibly "trying to
express the idea that if the mangrove forest at issue . .. was part
of the infrastructure whose vitality is essential to support and
nurture the human capabilities that are the foundation for a
well-lived life, then its owner is obligated to contribute to the
community's health."1 These laws support the capabilities of life
and good health.
Public Trust Doctrine
Public access to beaches has been expanded under the public
trust doctrine from fishing on a beach between the high and low
tide lines-wet-sand areas-to recreation on privately-owned
dry-sand portions of the beach. 52 The New Jersey Supreme Court
in Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc."
required that a private beach club provide the public with
reasonable access to the dry-sand area of its beach. Alexander
sees a justification in this decision on the basis of his social
obligation theory. He points out
that recreation is an important aspect of health, which is itself a
vital dimension of the capability of life, and that providing all
persons, including poor people, with reasonable access to basic
C.

modes of recreation and relaxation would materially contribute

to the goal of being capable of living lives worth living. 5 4
Alexander adds that recreation also supports affiliation,
which is an indispensable means to create just social relations. 5
This doctrine supports the capabilities of good health and
sociality.
D. Access to Vital Services
Health and affiliation also justify State v. Shack, 6 in which
workers for government-funded organizations that provided
health-care and legal services were permitted to enter private
property to aid migrant farm workers employed and housed on
the property. Alexander points out that the court rejected the
so 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981).
51 Alexander, supra note 12, at 800.
52 Id. at 802.
I 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005).
4 Alexander, supra note 12, at 806.
r Id. at 805.
5 277 A.2d 369, 370, 375 (N.J. 1971).
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trespass argument on grounds that the owner's property right
must accommodate access to such basic necessities as medical
care when it is the only effective means of providing it. 61 This
access supports the capabilities of good health and sociality.5 8
E. Nuisance
In the area of nuisance, Alexander finds that the tension
between two sets of competing capabilities is less easily resolved.
In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.," a factory was polluting the
area of surrounding residences with soot, smoke, and other
pollutants. On the side of the factory, the argument is that the
sacrifice of the residential owners is necessary to preserve a
culture that nurtures those goods that are essential for a welllived life-what promotes the capability of freedom. 0 On the
side of the residential owners, the argument is that the
preservation of culture is too attenuated an argument and that
the capabilities of the residential owners developed through
privacy and autonomy should be preserved.6 ' This decision
illustrates how the conflict between opposing capabilities is
difficult to resolve when the concept of rights is one of marking
off the domains of each side's capabilities. How is one really to
weigh the different capabilities in cases such as these?
Alexander can only leave the question open whether the Boomer
case should have been decided differently.62
Alexander, supra note 12, at 808-09.
In a more extended discussion of this case, Alexander points out that the
Shack decision also promotes the capabilities of freedom and practical reason.
Alexander & Pefialver, supra note 40, at 149-54.
59 26 N.Y.2d 219, 222, 257 N.E.2d 870, 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314 (1970), affd
sub nom. Kinley v. Atl. Cement Co., 349 N.Y.S.2d 199 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1973).
6o Alexander, supra note 12, at 780-81.
61 Id.
62 The nuisance area
is particularly prone to difficult-to-resolve tensions
between capabilities. Courts have ruled that the emission of noise is a nuisance.
Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz, 500 S.W.2d 217, 218, 221 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973)
(holding that the noise from air conditioning equipment serving an apartment
complex was found to be a nuisance against the plaintiffs home and was enjoined).
Fumes and dirt are also a nuisance. Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d at 223, 257 N.E.2d at 872,
309 N.Y.S.2d at 315 (holding that the dirt, smoke, and vibrations emanating from a
cement plant were found to be a nuisance against the land of neighboring owners,
and the court approved the granting of an injunction unless the defendant paid
plaintiffs permanent damages). On the other hand, courts have ruled that the
emission of noise is not a nuisance. Beckman v. Marshall, 85 So. 2d 552, 555-56
(Fla. 1956) (holding that the noise from small children in a day nursery was found
not to be a nuisance against the elderly plaintiffs' guest house). Also, fumes and dirt
51

58

2012]

UNCARING JUSTICE: JACQUE

123

In the process of describing how the law promotes important
capabilities in each case and settles on a fair manner in which to
promote them, Alexander arrives at the Jacque case and
interprets it also as one in which the law protects important
capabilities. He emphasizes the Jacques' need for privacy and
autonomy and affirms the need for punitive damages to protect
that need. Punitive damages help ensure that trespassers, like
Steenberg, will not intrude on the right to exclude of owners, like
the Jacques. But hold on now. Did the capabilities of the
Jacques really need protection in this case? It is true that
Steenberg did not show a need to develop or experience
capabilities in this situation beyond those it already had, but the
Jacques also did not show a need. There was no invasion of the
private space of the Jacques. Steenberg rolled the mobile home
over a vacant unused field owned by the Jacques as part of a 179acre farm in the middle of winter without harming the property.
There was no impingement on their lives or good health, nor on
their freedom to make deliberate choices, nor on their practical
reasoning. It was not a case where Steenberg prevented the
Jacques in any way from enjoying an intended use of this field.
As for the capability of sociality, whereby one is enabled to form
healthy relationships with others because one has security in the
privacy and autonomy of one's home, the Jacques appear to have
rejected the advantage of this capability-the formation of
healthy relationships-by turning away from Steenberg when
Steenberg called on the Jacques for help. The Jacques enjoyed

are not a nuisance. Reed v. Cook Constr. Co., 336 So. 2d 724, 725-26 (Miss. 1976)
(holding that the fumes, dirty dust, and clanking noises emanating from a cement
plant were found not to be a nuisance against the land of neighboring owners). One
interesting case that raises the issue of freedom of expression is Wernke v. Halas,
600 N.E.2d 117, 123 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). The Indiana Court of Appeals addressed
the case of two feuding neighbors where one had erected a five-foot high fence that
was ugly and probably erected out of spite, had tastelessly decorated his yard with a
toilet seat, and had allowed unattractive and vulgar graffiti scrawled by vandals to
remain on the concrete fence posts. Id. at 119. The court found that these
displeasing aesthetics did not constitute a nuisance, stating that "[alesthetic values
are inherently subjective," and the courts should not be arbiters of "proper aesthetics
and good taste." Id. at 122. The court gave more importance to the expression of the
tastes, mores, and attitudes of an individual as rights than to the use of those rights
in an uncaring manner to disturb that individual's neighbor who was hurt in his
property interest by the displeasing aesthetics.
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the privacy and autonomy of their home, but they refused to
exercise the capability of sociality that this privacy and
autonomy engendered.
Alexander is quite right to advocate that the law should
promote the capabilities that one needs to lead a distinctively
human life, but there are times when both sides in a dispute
have the proper capabilities. The question is rather one of the
proper use of these capabilities. Alexander does not address this
question in the Jacque case because his analysis does not include
the concept that the substantive content of the Jacques' choice
had value. Therefore, the only way he can evaluate the court's
opinion is based on whether the parties' capabilities were
properly protected. But does the law care only about ensuring
capabilities and not about their proper use? Even though
Alexander gives us that impression, there is a direction in the
law, not mentioned by Alexander, that suggests that the Jacque
case was wrongly decided and that the law really does promote
the proper use of capabilities. This direction appears in cases
that involve the doctrine of necessity, the recovery of property,
and deviations from a public highway.
F.

Doctrine of Necessity

In Ploof v. Putnam," the Supreme Court of Vermont held
that the plaintiff, who was driven by a sudden and violent
tempest to moor his sloop on the defendant's dock, could sue the
defendant in trespass and negligence when the defendant's
servant cast off the mooring, the sloop was lost, and the
plaintiffs family was injured. The defendant had a duty "to
permit the plaintiff to moor his sloop to the dock, and to permit it
to remain so moored during the continuance of the tempest."'
71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908).
" Id. The court in Ploof did not reach the issue of damages that might occur if
the vessel had been moored to the dock. Two years later, however, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota heard a similar case, Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., in which
the dock owner did not reject the vessel but claimed damages for the destruction
caused by the striking and pounding of the vessel moored to the dock during the
storm. 124 N.W. 221, 221 (Minn. 1910). The court found that the mooring of the
vessel to the dock was prudent seamanship and that
[t]he situation was one in which the ordinary rules regulating properly [sic]
rights were suspended by forces beyond human control, and if, without the
direct intervention of some act by the one sought to be held liable, the
property of another was injured, such injury must be attributed to the act
of God, and not to the wrongful act of the person sought to be charged.
6
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Here, the court required the defendant to preserve the life and
property of his neighbor. The defendant had a duty to exercise
his capabilities as a caring person. The doctrine of necessity
demonstrates that caring for the need of others when they are in
dire straits is a concern of the law."
G. Recovery of Property
In Wippert v. Burlington Northern Inc.," the federal district
court found that the defendant railroad was not a trespasser
when it entered the plaintiffs land to retrieve a train that had
derailed due to a strong wind. It applied the Restatement
(Second) of Torts as a source of law, which states that "[o]ne is
privileged to enter land in the possession of another, at a
reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, for the purpose of
removing a chattel to the immediate possession of which the
actor is entitled."6 7 The chattel must not have come upon the
land by the actor's consent, tortious conduct, or contributory
negligence, but if the loss of the chattel was innocent, then there
is no trespass in retrieving it." Here, the loss is neither one's life
nor the use of one's home. The owner who seeks to retrieve his
chattel is not in dire straits. Yet the court derogated from the
general right of the landowner to exclude by requiring a caring
attitude on the part of the landowner towards the one who
sought to retrieve his property.
H. Deviationsfrom a Public Highway
What is most interesting is that in cases very similar to the
Jacque case, other jurisdictions have even allowed individuals to
deviate from a public highway over the private land of others
Id. at 221-22. The owner of the dock was permitted to collect for the damages done
by the act of God to his dock, but these damages were only a way of allocating the
risk of loss to the person whose property would otherwise have been damaged by the
storm. They were not to rectify a wrong.
65 Similar to the doctrine of necessity is the easement of necessity. In Florida,
when a dwelling is hemmed in by other lands "so that no practicable route of egress
or ingress is available" to enter or leave the land, the owner has a right to a
statutory way of necessity over the lands that hem it in, and such use does not
constitute a trespass, provided that the use is in an orderly and proper manner. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 704.01(2) (West 2005). Access to one's property is important in order to
enjoy the privacy and autonomy of one's home ownership.
66 397 F. Supp. 73, 74, 77 (D. Mont. 1975).
67 Id. at 77.
68 Id.
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where an obstacle, such as heavy snowdrifts, caused an
impassible obstruction on the highway." In Campbell v. Race,"
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts ruled that there was no
trespass in such a case when a traveler could not pass by a
highway with his team of horses. The court stated that "[t]o hold
a party guilty of a wrongful invasion of another's rights, for
passing over land adjacent to the highway, under the pressure of
such a necessity, would be pushing individual rights of property
to an unreasonable extent."" It added that "[s]uch a temporary
and unavoidable use of private property, must be regarded as one
of those incidental burdens to which all property in a civilized
community is subject."" In Morey v. Fitzgerald," the Supreme
Court of Vermont approved the ruling in Campbell and added
that the nature of the obstacles, such as ice or washouts, need
not be unexpected, unforeseen, or of short duration to give rise to
the right to pass over the neighboring land. Furthermore, "[ilf
the obstruction is such that to remove it would materially delay
the traveler in his journey, and impose upon him any
These
considerable labor, no duty of removal is upon him."
cases are very much like the Jacque case on their facts, even to
the point of finding an obstruction in snowdrifts. Alexander sides
with the Jacque court in rejecting the application of a socialobligation norm in such cases. The courts of Vermont and
Massachusetts disagree.
Alexander advocates that the law play the role of fair arbiter
in determining who will enjoy the entitlement to capabilities
when they are in conflict. If one side demonstrates a greater
need for capabilities than the other, he maintains that the correct
decision is to award the entitlement to the side with the greater
He applauds the Jacque case because he thinks it
need."
accomplishes this objective, although, as demonstrated above, the
facts that support his argument are weak. His analysis goes no
69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 195(1) cmt. b (1965). These cases require
payment for damages that result from harm to the property used, id. § 195(2), but
again the payment appears to be only a way of allocating the loss caused by the
necessity to the person who would otherwise have suffered a greater loss.
70 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 408, 408 (1851).
n1 Id. at 412.
72 Id.
73 56 Vt. 487, 489-90 (1884).
74 Id. at 490.
7
See Alexander, supra note 12, at 815-16.
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further. Other cases, however, look beyond the distribution of
capabilities and find a further need for the law to encourage
people to help those in need.7 6 These cases promote human
flourishing through a virtue of caring. Justice is not merely a
fair distribution of capabilities but an encouragement to use
them properly. Should the law be concerned with giving such
encouragement? If the presumption is that each person will
choose to promote human flourishing with the capabilities he or
she possesses, the law need go no further. But this presumption
is not justified. We see many instances where people choose to
waste their resources and refuse to promote human flourishing.
In such cases, the law should discourage such waste and
selfishness, and it should encourage the type of caring that truly
leads to human flourishing. The Jacque case appears to be just
such a case in which the court should have done so. Alexander's
The Jacques had the
focus on capabilities is misplaced.
capabilities; they misused them. Vermont and Massachusetts
had no problem giving a right to those, such as Steenberg, who
needed to use the other's property to avoid an obstacle on a
public way. The Jacque court at the very least should have
disallowed the punitive damage award.
II. A COMPARISON WITH GROTIUS AND HOBBES

So why does Alexander limit his concept of the role of law to
ensuring that people are capable of making free choices without
further requiring the law to encourage the proper use of those
capabilities? Why does his concept of right refuse to judge
whether human actions have made proper use of their
capabilities to make free and knowing choices about their lives?
Alexander does not appear to concern himself with a person's
specific motivations, intentions, objectives, and consequences as
long as they do not detract from others' capabilities. This
avoidance suggests that there is no good or bad in such actions as
long as they take place within the space of a right. It is
important then to explore just what is this notion of right as a
space for amoral action.

76 See, e.g., Wippert v. Burlington N. Inc., 397 F. Supp. 73, 77 (D. Mont. 1975);
Morey, 56 Vt. at 489; Campbell, 61 Mass. (7 Cush) at 412.
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In the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645)
defined the concept of right (ius) as a quality of the person. It is
"a moral Quality annexed to the Person, enabling him to have, or
do, something justly."" In this definition, right enables a person
to do something justly; it does not command or prohibit it.
Grotius notes that the jurists call it a "Right which a Man has to
his own."78 Grotius' sense of "own" refers to one's own as a
subjective inherent quality of the rights holder, and it is Grotius'
primary definition of right-"[r]ight properly, and strictly
taken."79 Grotius divides this concept of right into (a) a power
over ourselves or others, (b) property, and (c) the faculty of
demanding what is due. 0 Through this tripartite division, right
is the area where God permits things that are not repugnant to
the natural law.81 Thus, in the area of property, although
initially one has a right to use all things in nature, natural law
permits the creation of the institution of property, which then
becomes subject to the natural law, as is evident in the case of
theft. Grotius states that "being once admitted, this Law of
Nature informs us, that it is a wicked Thing to take away from
any Man, against his Will, what is properly his own."82 Property
thus becomes a right within which one has the space to do as one
wishes. This manner of conceiving of a right places the emphasis
on what a person has the freedom to do, that is, on what he owns.
Right is a function of ownership already inherent in man's nature
as a faculty. It is the starting point for a duty on the part of a

77 HuGo GRoTIUs, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE bk. I, at 138 (Richard Tuck
ed., 2005) (1625) (emphasis omitted).
78 Id. (footnote omitted).
7
Id. (emphasis omitted).
" Id. at 138-39.

* Id. at 153-54.
82

Id. at 154.
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potential intruder to refrain from intruding upon that right."
Right in this sense is a space for freedom to act without being
restrained by an intruder.
Grotius develops this idea in his discussion of the right of the
poor in need to take from the rich. When God created man he
gave him dominion over all things in common so "that every Man
converted what he would to his own Use, and consumed
whatever was to be consumed."' This was the state before the
Fall when property did not exist. With the Fall it was no longer
possible to continue without property; so men consented to divide
things among themselves as property and thus produce a new
sort of right." Both the "right to common use" before the Fall
and the "right to property" after the Fall were freedoms within
the area permitted by the natural law." Grotius then explains
that since the rights of proprietors were "designed to deviate as
little as possible from the Rules of natural Equity," they have to
give way to the right of common use in the case of absolute
necessity.8 8 In other words, the switch from common use to
property bows to the natural law that requires equity. Thus, the
permissive area for switching to a state of property does not
include those things needed by the poor. When the poor in need
come to take from the rich, they are not taking the property of
the rich since the things the poor take are considered common
property.

8 Before Grotius popularized this concept of right, it had already been adopted
by the canonists of the twelfth century. The canonists note that among the multiple
meanings for ius in Gratian's Decretum, there is the meaning of "an area of
permitted behavior where 'nature does not command or forbid.'" BRIAN TIERNEY,
THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW, AND

CHURCH LAW, 1150-1625, at 63 (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publ'g Co. 2001) (1997). They
then define ius as "a certain ability by which man is able to discern between good
and evil, and in this sense natural ius is a faculty. . . and this is free will." Id. at 64
(quoting the English Summa, In nomine). The combination of an area of permitted
conduct with the idea of a faculty to express free will suggests something that a
person owns as inherent in himself apart from any pre-existing duty in others. This
notion of right gives ius the idea of a quality defining a person and only after this
quality is established does duty appear as a requirement in others to respect this
quality.
84 GROTIUS, supra note 77, at 421.
85 Id.
6
87

See id. at 154, 465.
Id.

8 Id.

at 434.
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Grotius grounds the notion of right on the notion of a faculty
in the rights holder that permits the rights holder to demand
protection for what he owns on the basis that he owns it. People
have a duty to respect this right as a result of the rights holder's
faculty. Grotius hedges this right within the constraints of the
natural law, but within the area of freedom where a person can
act without constraint, there is the possibility now of a freedom
to do what one wills. While this area "enabl[es] him to have, or
do, something justly," it also enables him to serve his own needs
and agenda without regard to any further concept of justice."
This notion of right does not threaten existing ideas of right and
virtue because it is constrained by the natural law. Whatever
actions are contrary to the natural law do not fall within one's
space of freedom to do what one desires. However, what would
happen if the natural law boundaries on human action were
removed and replaced with other boundaries that define only
what is necessary for human beings to survive in a world
dominated by power-seekers?
In 1651, twenty-six years after Grotius' work was published
in Paris, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) defined the concept of
right as freedom from any impediments to do as one would. 0 The
boundaries that confine this freedom are no longer a function of
justice as they are for Grotius. Rather, they are a function of
ensuring the security and safety of one's presence in the
The actual definition of right for Hobbes is
community.
unlimited freedom to do as one pleases, and the only reason for
boundaries is to ensure the ability to enjoy one's freedom against
others who would take it away." Joan Lockwood O'Donovan
describes Hobbes' notion of right as "the full flowering of the
proprietary paradigm of subjective right" defined as "each
individual's unrestrainedliberty 'to use his own power' and to act
for his self-preservation, so asserting both the radical priority of
natural right to natural law and the radical separation of natural
right from social obligation."92
O'Donovan's description of
Hobbes' concept of right is a well-formulated, comprehensive
" Id. at 138 (emphasis omitted).
90 3 THOMAS HOBBES, Leviathan: or, the Matter, Form and Power of a
Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, in THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS
HOBBES OF MALMESBURY 116 (Sir William Molesworth ed., 1839) (1651).
91 Joan Lockwood O'Donovan, Rights, Law and Political Community: A
Theological and HistoricalPerspective,TRANSFORMATION, Jan 2003, at 30, 35-36.
' Id. at 35.
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definition which includes three aspects of particular note. First,
the concept of right is one of ownership ("proprietary") removed
from justice ("natural law").
Second, it is a freedom of
indifference ("unrestrained liberty") rather than a freedom for
excellence (action directed towards one's proper end)." Third, it
is focused on self-preservation without any regard for the
common good ("social obligation"). It is in the area of selfpreservation that Hobbes finally has to accept restrictions on
one's unrestrained liberty, not because there is any concern for
the common good, but because he conceives the nature of people
to be such that without the restrictions a person could not
survive.
Hobbes' theory of human nature is that a man's worth is
what others esteem it to be." Esteem is given in proportion to
the power held by a man, whether it be just or unjust.95 The
reason for the esteem given for power is that power is the only
thing that assures one's living well because happiness does not
consist in the greatest good but rather in the attainment of one's
desires.96 The quest for power manifests itself in competition for
gain, diffidence for safety, and glory for reputation,97 which, in a
state of nature, leaves man constantly with a disposition towards
war.98 Hence "the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
and short."99 Since man cannot assure this power for himself in a
state of nature because "the weakest has strength enough to kill
the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy
with others,"100 men decide to restrict their rights with articles of
peace, otherwise known as the laws of nature.10 '

93 Servais Pinckaers defines freedom of indifference as the freedom to choose
between contraries such as good and evil. This freedom focuses on the means to the
end. Freedom for excellence, on the other hand, is the freedom that one achieves by
choosing God through the grace of Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit. This
freedom focuses on the end itself. SERVAIS PINCKAERS, THE SOURCES OF CHRISTIAN
ETHICS 374-76 (Mary Thomas Noble trans., 1995).
94 HOBBES, supra note 90, at 76.
* Id. at 79-80.

9

Id. at 85.

9

Id. at 112.

98 Id. at 112-13.

* Id. at 113.
100 Id. at 110.
"I' Id. at 116.
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Natural right (jus naturale) for Hobbes is the complete
freedom one has to use his own power for self-preservation, even
to the extent of using another's body.102 O'Donovan is correct
that it is an "unrestrained liberty," at least in a state of nature.1 03
For Hobbes, there is no justice or injustice in the state of
nature.'0 4 However, once man agrees to the articles of peace
(laws of nature), these laws put a restraint on his liberty (natural
right) by forbidding him to do what is destructive of life or what
fails to preserve it. 0 This agreement limits his natural right of
unrestrained liberty to a freedom to do as he will only within the
bounds of these laws of nature, assuming, of course, that the laws
themselves do not threaten his life. 06 Through these laws, he
gives up his liberty (natural right) to hinder another's liberty in
order to benefit his own, and if he violates these laws it is then
that he does an injustice.'
Thus, injustice consists wholly in
violating one's agreement signified in the articles of peace (laws
of nature).
Hobbes builds a whole system of laws on the basis of this
social contract.
These restraints on natural right look
remarkably like what one would ordinarily call just: to seek
peace, to act in self-defense, to keep one's covenants, to express
one's gratitude for gifts, to strive to accommodate oneself to
others, to pardon others' offences, to avoid revenge in
punishment, to avoid hatred of others, to humbly acknowledge
equality with others, to acknowledge the equal rights of all, and
generally to follow the Golden Rule.'s Hobbes then asserts that
these laws "oblige in foro interno" because they are the result of a
desire that they should take place. 09 In other words, these laws
become a system of morality in which justice is the pursuit of
self-preservation through conscience-binding laws that promote
the cause of peace as good and avoid the cause of war as evil.
10 Id. at 116-17.
10 O'Donovan, supra note 91, at 35.
104 HOBBES, supra note 90, at 115.
105 Id. at 116-17.

11 The right of self-defense remains inalienable so that covenants not to defend
oneself are void, and man has the liberty to disobey the Sovereign's commands to kill
himself, liberty to refuse to incriminate himself, and liberty to avoid killing himself
or another. Id. at 2005.
1o7 Id. at 119.
.s Id. at 117-45.
log Id. at 145.
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The premise for morality is self-centered and lawless but it
produces laws that look very much like the laws that could
operate in pursuance of a common good. Does Hobbes then
maintain that moral direction can evolve from self-centered
desires?
Hobbes does not harbor any thoughts that a person evolves
towards self-perfection. A person is who a person is, and there is
no such thing as moral direction toward the good except as
Hobbes defines it, that is, as a mode of self-preservation.1 10 For
Hobbes there is no sense of right as the pursuit of what perfects a
man. Man is composed of desires and all that is important is
that these desires be satisfied."' The ideal legal system marks
off the boundaries beyond which a person may not venture, but
within those boundaries one is free to act in any way one
desires." 2 In effect, people own their own private spaces and
they have a right to act within those spaces as owners. A person
respects the private space of another because the other owns it
and the law protects ownership, not because the respect is a way
to self-perfection.
Judgments are the prerogative of the
sovereign power because the only way to ensure self-preservation
is by a covenant made by the community to create an absolute
sovereign who acts and judges to ensure that all live peaceably
among themselves." 3 The sovereign is a deputy of the people, not
of God. Thus, for Hobbes, there is no motivation towards the
common good. There is merely the compulsion of a sovereign
power that one obeys, both because one wants it to continue
existing in order to accomplish one's purpose of self-preservation
and because the sovereign power compels.
As an example of this orientation in one of Hobbes' laws of
nature, Hobbes gives the law that requires one to accommodate
oneself to others. This law of nature requires that one not "strive
to retain those things which to himself are superfluous, and to
others necessary."" 4 The reason for this rule is not that of
Grotius who finds that equity derived from the natural law of
God requires one's surplus to remain common property in the
presence of a poor person in need. Rather, it is because "he that
110 Id. at 146-47.
"I Id. at 85.
112
113
114

Id. at 206.
Id. at 159-60.
Id. at 139.
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shall oppose himself against it, for things superfluous, is guilty of
the war that thereupon is to follow.""' Hobbes focuses on
helping the poor person in need because of the bad consequences
that will follow for the rich person, not because the rich person
will advance in self-perfection by considering the good of others.
The difference between the two is manifest in the fact that a
Hobbesian rich person who thinks he can get away with it has
every reason to kill a poor person who is taking his surplus
property, whereas a Grotian rich person does not. Killing other
people is a right one has in Hobbes' state of nature because
nothing is unjust in that state and one has a right to another's
body."' This right does not disappear when one creates a social
contract to protect oneself. It is merely restricted. But if one can
avoid the restrictions without detection, there is no other moral
reason to refrain from killing the poor person. Even in the rich
person's conscience (in foro interno), according to Hobbes, there is
no conflict because the only binding norm is the perpetuation of a
system that preserves oneself." 7 Justice as the giving of another
his due is nonexistent.
Hobbes' philosophy produces a person engaged in
maximizing his freedom to act wholly by his own desires. It
helps to confirm O'Donovan's thesis that the philosophy of the
liberal contractarian political tradition of which Hobbes was a
part is a philosophy of "possessive individualism" wherein the
rights-bearing subject is a controlling, acquisitive, competitive
possessor who forms relationships through contract-based
calculations of self-interest.'
She claims that the emergence of
this philosophy is "one with the historical transformation of the
western Christian tradition of natural law and natural right into
a tradition of natural rights""9 and thus faults Hobbes, along
with other writers in the contractarian tradition, with the rise of
possessive individualism. It is certainly true that Hobbes
employs the concept of right as ownership, meaning a freedom to
do what one wills within the bounds of that ownership, with a
final end of self-preservation. He adopts the notion of right as a
Id.
Id. at 115-17.
117 See HOBBES, supra note 90, at 145.
u1 Joan Lockwood O'Donovan, Natural Law and Perfect Community:
Contributionsof ChristianPlatonism to Political Theory, 14 MOD. THEOLOGY 19, 20
(1998).
115
116

"

Id. at 21.
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faculty that, contrary to Grotius' notion of right, operates in an
area unconstrained by the commands and prohibitions of the
natural law. The only constraints are the exigencies demanded
by the self-concern of human nature to preserve itself. Once
these exigencies are satisfied, the individual is free to do as he
wishes, even to the point of totally ignoring one's fellow man.
For Grotius, the space for freedom was constrained by the
moral direction of the natural law.12 0 For Hobbes, the space for
freedom was constrained by the appetitive direction of the desire
for power.121 The contrast demonstrates the point that if one
chooses to define the concept of right as a space for freedom, one
separates human action within the space of freedom from moral
direction, and one can lose the moral direction of the law
completely if those spaces for freedom are not themselves
Grotius maintained the
restricted by the natural law.
connectivity of human action with morality by confining the
space for freedom within the moral dictates of the natural law,
but even he had no qualms in asserting that certain actions
within the space for freedom were properly amoral.12 2 Once the
foot was in the door, so to speak, it did not take long for someone
like Hobbes to remove the space for freedom from the strictures
of the natural law and to find the space for freedom confined only
by the strictures of a desire for power.12 3 When one accepts
Hobbes' view, the result is that all human action becomes
amoral.
Alexander adopts a concept of freedom that is neither that of
The parameters of right in
Grotius nor that of Hobbes.
Alexander's world are determined by what is necessary to give a
fair distribution of capabilities for human flourishing to human
beings in society. The capabilities themselves are the end sought
by the law. Since the concern is one that cares about the wellbeing of others and not merely about self-preservation, this
concept of right does not advocate an amoral Hobbesian world. It
does advocate a space for freedom reminiscent of Grotius' world.
However, it imposes no natural law limitations on what can be
done within this space for freedom. It does not encourage the
proper use of the capabilities for human flourishing. Rather, it
120
121
122

2

See GROTIUS, supra note 77, at 154.
See HOBBES, supra note 90.
See GROTIUS, supra note 77, at 154.
See HOBBES, supra note 90.
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implicitly accepts the idea that each person could construct his or
her own direction in life without regard to whether it produces
any good in society beyond the ability to make choices freely.
The Jacque case demonstrates Alexander's position. Even
though the Jacques enjoyed the security of their home, they
chose to turn away from a neighbor in need, and the law
endorsed their action. Alexander does not comment on this
failure to care. For him, caring for one's neighbor's welfare is not
important; it is only important to care that others have the
proper capabilities to act freely. The spaces for freedom defined
as rights by Alexander are sufficiently open-ended to allow one to
pass by on one side of the road when one sees a person in difficult
circumstances. The slogan for this approach is that we are not
our brother's keeper except when his life and good health,
freedom to make deliberate choices, practical reasoning, and
sociality are at stake. In all other cases we have the freedom
within our rights to ignore the other person's plight and go about
our own business.
III. A COMPARISON WITH AQUINAS

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) approaches the whole area of
right and duty from a different perspective. Rather than
emphasizing right as a space for freedom within which one can
do as one pleases, Aquinas emphasizes that right arises from the
direction of the natural law within one's heart calling one to give
to another what is due from a consideration of the common
good.' 2 4 Aquinas defines right (ius) as the just.125 Justice is what
directs one in one's relations with others.126 What is owed is to
render to a person his due, and the habit of doing so "rectifies the
deed and the will."127 Aquinas refers to right in this sense as a
man's "own," but it is defined in terms of justice. Justice is "a
habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant
and perpetual will."128 A person's due is what a "just man gives
to another .. . through consideration of the common good."' 29 If it
124 See 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. II-II, Q. 58, art. 5, at
1438 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros., Inc. 1947)
(1266-1273) [hereinafter 2 SUMMA THEOLOGICAl.
"1 Id. at pt. II-II, Q. 57, art. 1, at 1431.
126 Id.
127 Id.
at pt. II-II, Q. 58, art. 1, at 1435.
128 Id.
(emphasis omitted).
129 Id. at pt. II-II, Q. 58, art. 12, at 1443.
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were merely an entitlement based on ownership, then the rights
holder could relieve the other person of his duty, but Aquinas
does not allow for this type of relief. He states that if something
is contrary to natural right, "the human will cannot make it just,
for instance by decreeing that it is lawful to steal or to commit
adultery."1 30 In other words, justice "directs man to the common
good,"13 ' and the common good determines what is ownership;
ownership does not determine what is the common good. 132
It is important to distinguish here between the concept of
human flourishing as understood by Alexander and by Aquinas.
Alexander defines human flourishing as experiencing the
functionings made possible by the capabilities of one's life and
good health, freedom, practical reasoning, and sociality. 13 3 In a
world that defines human beings as determined to no particular
end, the mere existence of these capabilities is what dictates the
excellence of a human being. Whatever particular life a human
being lives with these capabilities, the value of that life is
dependent on having different types of life to choose from, having
the freedom to choose any one of these different types of life,
having the use of his own practical reasoning power to decide on
this life, and having a supportive community within which to live
one's life. According to Alexander, however, the value of life is
not dependent on the specific way in which one uses these
Aquinas defines human
capabilities as functionings.134
flourishing in a different manner. The value of one's life is
dependent on the end to which one directs one's life, which in
turn guides the way in which one uses one's capabilities as
functionings.as One must strive to have, and the legal system
Id. at pt. II-II, Q. 57, art. 2, at 1432.
Id. at pt. II-II, Q. 58, art. 5, at 1438.
11 Likewise, injustice is contempt of the common good, id. at pt. II-II, Q. 59,
art.1, at 1443, and gives rise to a claim of right calling for coercion to enforce that
right. Since the right is founded on justice and not ownership, the coercion itself is
not an inherent right of the rights holder. It belongs to God to judge, or it belongs to
someone appointed as God's servant by some agreement among men to judge. Id. at
pt. II-II, Q. 60, art. 2, at 1447, art. 6, at 1450. A judge with this authority "asserts
the right (jus dicens)" as an "object of justice" that derives its authority from God's
eternal law. Id. at pt. II-II, Q. 60, art. 1, at 1446. A judge without this authority
judges unjustly and therefore without coercive force. Id. at pt. II-II, Q. 60, art. 6, at
1450-51.
133 See Alexander, supra note 12, at 765-66.
114 See supra note 30.
135See SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 124, at pt. II-II, Q. 23, art. 7, at 1274.
1s0
131
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should work to ensure that one has, the capabilities to function in
a well-ordered life, as Alexander maintains. But even if one's
capabilities are deficient, it is the end that one chooses to have,
regardless of the deficiencies in one's capabilities, that
determines one's flourishing.
What is that end towards which a life of excellence is
directed? It is charity."' According to Aquinas, one who loves
with the virtue of charity realizes the perfection of himself."'
Charity itself is what makes a person excellent. Charity is a gift
from God that is offered to a person for his acceptance, and one
accepts this gift through an exercise of one's powers of
understanding and willing to make the free choice to love. But
the fact that these powers exist in varying degrees in different
human beings does not mean that human beings are more or less
excellent depending on the degree to which they have these
powers. Their excellence is determined by the degree to which
they live in charity. Furthermore, charity is not a means to some
further beneficial end for the person who loves; it is its own
reward. The love of wine or a horse is the type of love that exists
for the good from these things that we wish for ourselves; this is
not charity. The love of a friend for the good of that friend is
charity.3 s The former type of love-of wine or a horse-arises in
one's sensitive appetite as a matter of concupiscence, whereas the
latter type of love-of a friend-arises in one's will as a matter of
God's grace."' It is true that one can love a person by reason of
his own desire to get something from him, but this is the love of
concupiscence.14 0 Charity rather is the love of one's neighbor that
he may be in God, that is, that the neighbor may love God in
charity.14 ' The love of charity is more than just wishing another
136 Charity is the most excellent of the virtues, and no true virtue is possible
without charity. Id. at pt. II-II, Q. 23, art. 6, at 1273, art. 7, at 1274. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to consider all the virtues, but Aquinas does espouse the idea of
a unity of the virtues, id. at pt. II-II, Q. 58, art. 4, at 1437, art. 5, at 1438, which
opposes the idea of an indeterminate pluralistic evaluative framework (with
sometimes conflicting values), which Pefialver attributes to virtue ethics. Pefialver,
supra note 18, at 874-75. Nevertheless, Pefialver provides a helpful discussion of
three virtues, which can be used effectively to promote human flourishing in
decisions about land use: industry, justice, and humility. Id. at 876-86.
1
See SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 124, at pt. II-II, Q. 23, art. 7, at 1274.
1as Id. at pt. II-II, Q. 23, art. 1, at 1269.
13
Id. at pt. II-II, Q. 24, art .1, at 1276.
10 Id. at pt. II-II, Q. 23, art. 1, at 1269.
141 Id.
at pt. II-II, Q. 25, art. 1, at 1286, art. 2, at 1287.
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well; it is the communication of a certain mutual love between
friend and friend whereby they share a union of affections that
comes from the intellective, and not the sensitive, appetite.14 2 It
is especially noteworthy that this love of charity extends even to
our enemies when they find themselves in a case of urgent
need.143 Thus, the love of charity is a reaching out, not a
reaching in. To love is more important than to be loved because
the act of charity is in loving, not in being loved-just as a
mother seeks to love more than to be loved.144 One loves for the
sake of loving itself, and it is in this type of love-the love that is
charity-that we can see that virtue is practiced for its own

sake.145
Aquinas illustrates his notion of right-as one based on a
claim of justice rather than on a claim of ownership-in his
discussion of the duty to give one's surplus to the poor. Aquinas
states that theft is contrary to justice because one secretly takes
possession of that which belongs to another.14 6 Yet, four articles
later in the Summa, Aquinas states that "it is lawful for a man to
succor his own need by means of another's property, by taking it
either openly or secretly."1 47 In fact, "a man may also take
secretly another's property in order to succor his neighbor in
need."14 8 How does Aquinas reconcile these two apparently
contradictory statements? Aquinas explains:
Things which are of human right cannot derogate from natural
right or Divine right. Now according to the natural order
established by Divine Providence, inferior things are ordained
for the purpose of succoring man's needs by their

Id. at pt. II-II, Q. 23, art. 1, at 1269; id. at pt. II-II, Q. 27, art. 2, at 1306.
1n Id. at pt. II-II, Q. 25, art. 9, at 1292.
1" Id. at pt. II-II, Q. 27, art. 1, at 1305.
*4Id. at pt. II-II, Q. 27, art. 1, at 1305-06.
'4
Id. at pt. II-II, Q. 66, art. 3, at 1478. Aquinas advocates the right to own
property because it enables one to use the things of this earth in order to flourish. In
fact, he speaks directly to the efficiency of such ownership when he says that: (1) one
is more likely to care for what is his own than for what belongs to the community at
large, (2) there is less confusion in dealing with property divided among the
ownerships of several individuals than if everyone had an indeterminate role, and
(3) there are fewer quarrels when each person has a stake. See id. at pt. II-II, Q. 66,
art. 2, at 1477.
147 Id. at pt. II-II, Q. 66, art. 7, at 1481.
142
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means... . Hence whatever
certain people have in
superabundance is due, by natural law, to the purpose of
succoring the poor....
Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is
impossible for all to be succored by means of the same thing,
each one is entrusted with the stewardship of his own things, so
that out of them he may come to the aid of those who are in
need. 149

Justice specifically determines the concept of ownership
here. The owner of property has a duty-an obligation to give
what is due-to give his surplus to the poor because God has
ordained that property is meant to serve the purpose of succoring
man in his need and the surplus is not needed by the owner but
is needed by the poor. If the need does not reach the level of
extreme need, the owner still has the duty to give, but the right
on the part of the poor is only moral and not legal. It becomes a
legal right when there is extreme need and then the poor can
even effectuate their own taking. It is significant that Aquinas
prefers to use the term "stewardship" of one's own things rather
than "ownership" in this passage, because it conveys the idea
that while one has ownership of one's own property, it is an
ownership like that of a fiduciary who cares for the property on
behalf of others, as well as himself. Property is owned privately
but treated as if it were held in common with all.5 0 Here, the
idea of flourishing exists in the very engagement of the property
owner in the act of giving to others out of the virtue of charity.
Aquinas and Grotius both reach the conclusion that the rich
must give to the poor, but they differ significantly over the
definition of the right that is involved. Grotius reaches the
conclusion by maintaining that the natural law of equity limits
the area of the natural law that permits the creation of property
so that the poor have a right to property held in common.
Aquinas reaches the conclusion by maintaining that the natural
law of justice requires the rich to give what is due to the poor.
For Grotius, the poor own the "right to common use" not because
the rich have a duty towards the poor, but because the right is
inherent in the poor as a faculty. For Aquinas, the poor have no
inherent right, but do have a right stemming from the duty of the
149

Id. at pt. II-II,

Q. 66, art. 7, at 1480-81; see also id. at pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 5,

at 1327-28.
1" Id. at pt. II-II, Q. 66, art. 2, at 1477 (citing 1 Tim. 6:17-18).
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rich. The duty-to give one his due-generates the right for
Aquinas; the right generates the duty-to leave the poor alone in
the exercise of their right-for Grotius. One sees this difference
most clearly in the contrast of two texts from Aquinas and
Grotius. Aquinas sees the right of the poor as founded on the
duty to give alms as directed in Luke 11:41.111 Grotius, on the
other hand, says "[t]hat Sentiment [the right to take from
another what is absolutely necessary to preserve one's life] is not
founded on what some alledge, that the Proprietor is obliged by
the Rules of Charity to give of his Substance to those that want
it."' Thus, the manner of Grotius' conceiving of a right places
emphasis on what a person has the freedom to do-i.e., on what
he owns-and opposes the way in which duty is determined by
Aquinas. Grotius notes that the jurists call it a "Right which a
Man has to his own,"s 3 but Grotius' sense of "own" is no longer
that of Aquinas. Rather than referring to one's own as what is
due, Grotius refers to one's own as a subjective inherent quality
of the rights holder. For Aquinas, duty-what is due-is a
function of one's relationship to God, who directs man in his
rational nature towards the common good. It is the starting
point for what then becomes the recipient's right to what is due.
In specifying the concept of right as stemming from duty,
Aquinas offers a wholly different approach to right than that
stemming from Grotius and Hobbes and adopted by Alexander.
Aquinas' concept of right gives a fully integrated theory that
alleviates the danger that the concept of right may be used by a
Hobbes proponent to advocate a system of amoral behavior. It
also clarifies the role of law. Law is not merely an enabler; it is
also an encourager of moral behavior. Since one has an end of
the good, and the fulfillment of this end remains uncertain
because one also has the freedom to choose or not to choose this
end, the law's encouragement of moral behavior without
imposing it supports one's efforts toward excellence.

is

Id. at pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 5, at 1327.
77, at 434-35.
omitted).

152 GROTIUS, supra note
" Id. at 138 (emphasis
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CONCLUSION

Behavior that is truly moral is done in freedom. The law
cannot force a person to be moral, nor should it. Yet the law
performs a beneficial role in society when it encourages moral
behavior. It certainly is an important function of law to ensure
the capabilities to function with such goods as life and good
health, the freedom to make deliberate choices, practical
reasoning, and sociality. It is also important to encourage the
good use of these capabilities. Grotius, despite his care to restrict
the concept of right within the bounds of the natural law,
nevertheless formulated the concept in such a way as to permit
its abuse. Right as a space for freedom became a space for
license in the hands of Hobbes. Alexander rejects the anti-social
leanings of Hobbes in order to advocate an integrated
interdependent society, but he stops short of defining the role of
law as encouraging moral behavior. The result is that when
capabilities are fully accounted for, individuals such as the
Jacques can turn away from a person in need and show an
uncaring attitude. Such an uncaring attitude is a form of license.
It does not follow the great commandment to love one's neighbor
as illustrated so tellingly in the Parable of the Good Samaritan.
It is not sufficient that one merely feed the poor; charity demands
that one also succor those in need."'" If the law is truly the
guardian of society, it should work to ensure the encouragement
of such love of one's neighbor. Ultimately, as Aquinas so
masterfully demonstrates, there is no space within the concept of
right to do as one merely desires with no regard for the ultimate
goal of excellence in our lives. Right gives one the freedom to
choose, but it is a freedom to choose the good. If one fails to
choose the good, one loses one's freedom by becoming enslaved by
one's desires. Therefore, the law should support the freedom to
choose the good-loving one's neighbor rather than turning away.
The Jacque court could have adopted the approach of
Vermont and Massachusetts to find that there was no trespass
by Steenberg on the Jacques' property due to the obstructed
passage along the road. But even if it were to insist on finding a
14 CATECEISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH para. 2446, at 588 (1994) ("When we
attend to the needs of those in want, we give them what is theirs, not ours. More

than performing works of mercy, we are paying a debt of justice.") (quoting St.

Gregory the Great, Regula Pastoralis,3, 21: PL 77, 87).
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trespass, the court should not have encouraged the Jacques to
turn away from their neighbor by rewarding them with $100,000
in punitive damages. The nominal compensatory damages of $1
is sufficient to recognize the freedom on the part of the Jacques
to turn away if they so choose, but the law should not condone
such behavior. The law has a role to guide and educate persons
to make the choice for human flourishing in the form of caringmuch as the Parable of the Good Samaritan guides us to love our
neighbor.

